- lived form 1724-1804
- Kant declared that Hume awoke him from his slumber
- when Kant read Hume's Treatise Concerning Human Understanding, it got him out of the rationalism of the day
- people were thinking:
- 'we need to get clear on a priori truthsbecause they are tainted by experience
- our senses are fallible, they are limited, they need to be tempered, assessed against truths which we can be sure are not tainted
- example of an a priori truth is mathematics
- this is rationalism
- when Kant read Hume, it shook him out of the stupor of focusing so much on stuff separate from the senses
- truths are universal and free of experience
- Hume: the only verifiable truths are from experience
- Hume's Fork: (two sources of knowledge)
- 1. Matters of fact
- was the light red or amber? Well, there is a truth to the matter, and the challenge is to figure it out
- are Africans equals, or not? There is a truth
- Hume: we can't ever get to this, we can only access the world as it is mediated through our ideas of it
- and the whole of my ideas are my experience
- 2. Relation of ideas
- can be related causally, constantly conjoined ideas
- red and apple, warm and tasty, hard and smooth
- when these ideas come from experience, then they are a source of knowledge
- these two prongs to the fork show that no idea can be really known
- this is a catch-22,
- 3. (Kant's Prong) synthetic a priori – FUCKING HUGE!
- we can never access the world as it is, we can always only experience the world as we are able to experience it.
- it is not that our mind must conform to the world, but the world of stuff and beings must conform to our mind in order to be experienced at all
- ex. the only reason why you can be experienced is because you conform to the apparatus by which we experience things, the mind
- the world must be a certain way for anything to be experienced in the world
- Hume/Locke: how can I be sure that my idea of the out there is a representation of what is out there?
- Kant: you are starting from the wrong side of the relationship!
- Two worlds:
- external world: material stuff, the world as it is
- inner world: the world in one's own head
- you can't assume that the stuff out there is as it seems, because you can't be outside of this mind – boot the imagination, anything that is unreliable, memory, and pure ideas are what are left, and these pure ideas are attributable to the stuff out there
- Hume: you can't ever get to the external world, as it is. The best you can do is have an idea of pink, because it seems to be there, that seems to be coming from there
- Kant says: look, you are starting from the external world and saying this stuff is how it is, but you can't get to the external world independently of the mind
- Kant: it is not our ideas that mediate, but there is a basic furniture of the mind to have experiences of a certain sort, because things in the world are relatable to one another, and the mind is predisposed to:
Faculties of the Understanding- number: distinguish between different things
- probability: likely, possible, modes
- allows us to experience cause and effect
....... - space: everything that is experience is always in space
- time: everything that is experienced is always in time
- you can't say anything about the external world, because your relationship to the world is temporal and spatial
- a human being's experience is impossible if space and time are absent
- some other creature may be capable of experiencing things which are not temporal and spatial, because it is not limited to space and time
- we can speculate then that non-human animals experience the world in a much different way than humans
- dogs can hear high pitched whistles which we might conclude do not exist without the experience
- in the present state, the world must be temporal and spatial to be experienced
(there's like 6 of them in all)
- the world must be temporal for things to be experienced by humans
- it happens now
- the world must be spatial
- it happens somewhere
- the world must have cause and effect
- if something happens something else happens and they are connected in causation
- if something doesn't conform to the demands of time and space(here, now, there, soon)we necessarily experience things this way and so the world must conform to us in order for it to experience it
- the ability to experience at all is what Kant focuses upon
- so...the external world must conform to the faculties of the understanding
- phenomenal – anything that is, which is available to experience
- if it can be experienced, it is phenomenal
- ex. it is temporal, spatial, causally related to other stuff in the universe
- Kant thought we can refine our abilities to understand the phenomenal, but we can never experience anything as knowledge
- knowledge is limited to phenomena, and it is subject to fallibility
- noumenal – all that is as it is; existence in itself not constrained by requirement of experience
- many philosophers were trying to get at stuff as it is, free of perception and self-imposed reality
- so knowledge can only speculate on the noumenal
- it is at least possible for something to exist and not be definable by knowledge
- when God shows himself he becomes phenomenal
- when God no longer shows himself, he is as he is, he is beyond experience
- now...ethics?
- Are we only phenomenal?
- In addition to 'God' – a noumenal thing – self is nominal as well
- I am not the limits of your phenomenal experience of me
- I can make myself do things which I do not want to do
- I can manipulate myself
- let's not call it the self, let's call it the will
- because it is the will that makes me do things
- we are free, rational, and self-governing
- I create laws for myself
- a self-induced law governs my reality
- it must be the case that the will is also, in itself, distinct form experience, unlimited by the constraints of time and space and cause and effect
- 'freedom' is on the noumenal side
- nothing is free as a phenomenal thing, you must conform to the requirements of experience of cause and effect
- constraints are imposed on the phenomenal side
- the noumenal side is metaphysically free and unconstrained by the requirements of experience
- on the noumenal side, it doesn't have to be anything but what it is
- the part of us that is free is the will – we can only speculate about this
- Metaphysics of Morals 1 – what morality is not
- morality has to do with the free will and it's ability to govern itself
- it must be possible for us to be metaphysically free
- will allows itself to be governed by love
- will allows itself to be governed by instinct
- will allows itself to be governed by self-interest
- will allows itself to be governed by pleasure
- gut feelings are phenomenal
- when the will allows itself to be governed by something other than itself, it is not moral
- the will must govern itself in accordance with duty
- the will is free – causally independent
- we experience the will, and so understand it through its effect in the world
- the will is what gets us to do something
– has effect in the world by motivating action - there are two component parts to the self:
- subject of the law: the rest of you; the material stuff of you; the 'phenomenal self'
- will as lawgiver: sometimes referred to as the 'noumenal self'
- does not conform to time/space
- is, in a sense, like God, in that it cannot be experienced
- at best, knowledge of God can be had
- the will is not in the realm of experience as it is
- all we can know is its effects
- so we can know whether a will is 'good' through its effects
- autonomous – self-governing
- heteronomous – governed by many things, by others
- but for Kant, the will is ALWAYS FREE
- it is capable of being either autonomous or heteronomous
- whether I am heteronomous (allow another to direct me) is always, in every moment, a determination of the will
- one chooses to follow orders
- to comply with the command of another is a moment to moment choice
- nobody can escape responsibility by saying, “They made me do it”
- the will can be good or not
- good will → then actions which are determined by the good will are morally worthy
- not so interested in wrong action – only mistaken about what was 'right'
- focused not on the consequences but on the motivation
- benefit is not how morality is determined
- why it was done, not what it accomplished
- if action is motivated by a good will, then it is a morally worthy action
- virtues can be abused – and be used to do not good (ch. 1 sec. 1)
- only the will can be good without qualification
- we know the will by its effects
- it's principle effect is in the motivation it provides
- if my will is motivated by the presence of a duty, then the will is sufficient, good
- happiness is not relevant to morality
- agrees that happiness is the end of all living things
- but that doesn't make it moral
- just because something makes you happy does not make it good
- though...all things are inclined toward happiness
- don't confuse happiness with the good, morality
- why: nature provides every living thing with a means to become happy: instinct
- the Greeks were wrong when they said reason is the tool that allows us to live happy lives
- feeling good is fine, but it doesn't need to be called morality
- if it makes you feel good, fine, but don't call that motivation morality, because it is motivated by feeling
- an action is morally worthy when it is motivated by a duty
- if you do the very same action, differently motivated, it can be worthy or not
- a good will prompts one to act because of duty
- not according to duty, because of duty
- if the motivation of action is not duty, that changes fundamentally the morality of an action
- this must be a moral duty
- 1. morality stems not from inclination, but from duty
- when it is from duty, the action acquires true moral worth
- 2. an action done from duty derives its moral worth not form the purpose, but from the maxim by which it is determined
- maxim – the subjective principle of volition
- for each person, that principle that moves a person to act
- today, called a higher/second order principle which guides our action
- each person is their own lawgiver, but what ought to motivate you is not subjective
- what kind of maxim are you acting upon
- categorical imperative: act only on that maxim which can be, at the same time, universal law
- the kind of maxim which satisfies this second proposition is the kind which can be willed at the same time to be universal
- this is to universalize it
- a law for every moral agent, not just for me
- it must be the case that the noumenal self recognizes that its the phenomenal self that must be acting
- we are phenomenal selves that are acting
- it must be possible for me to do it, otherwise it is against reason
- 'ought implies can'
- it must be possible before it can be a must
- it must be possible for everyone to do it phenomenally
- 'material contradiction' – a contradiction not in logic but one that results when something is being willed that is not materially possible
- is this the kind of maxim that if I comply with it I can will that everyone comply as well
propositions
- autonomy – using duty to govern oneself
- the will governing itself
- and the will is free – this is the noumenal self
- the will governs itself using reason
- heteronomous – for the will to be governed by something else
- we can make ourselves heteronomous when we submit our will to another's
- all that can be experienced is a phenomenal thing
- yes, if you live a moral life, you might be happy
- but morality and happiness are not combined for sure
- Plato was the only other who acknowledged this
- but the just person should be happy in that they are being just
- reason is not suited to happiness
- for Kant: reason is the only capacity by which we can comprehend the good
- 'practical rationality is reason applied to action'
- practical rationality includes the ability to contemplate what is not
- whenever it is said 'that ought to be the case,' it is not the way things are
- rationality comes in determining what is achieved from what is actual
- to envision some state of affairs that is different from this state of affairs
- unlike modal logic, practical rationality eventually gets us to x ought to be
- duty for a professor: when I have a duty to grade you according to your merit, then I ought to grade you according to your merit
- we need to compare X and Y to the good
- Kant says reason is the only way to comprehend the good
- also: principle function of reason is to take what is actual or possible and compare it to the good
- now here's the hard part, how does one access the good?
- now the categorical imperative comes in
- you are not morally culpable for what impedes X
- what makes actions right is if you were motivated by the duty to do X
- so the categorical imperative provides us with a second order rule that governs rules
- Categorical Imperative
- Act only on that maxim which can, at the same time, be willed to be a universal law.
- Simply the formal expression of the good
- Material Contradiction
- it is irrational for the noumenal self to tell the phenomenal self to do something it cannot do
- ex. if a man's will tells him to go forth and become pregnant
- in religious terms – the noumenal self is the soul
- he sort of de-theologizes it
- Kant: there is a way to live that is better, and that is to live morally, to live rightly, not just happily because you can be happy and immoral
- formal expression of the good
- it doesn't provide you substance or content – no virtues, no actions, no consequences
- tells you the logical, rational form
- and reason is important – it is not individuated, it is not subjective: reason is objective
- the Renaissance is due to reason
- in the dark ages: seeking to understand is the devil's work
- just accept this, and deny that
- once something becomes dogmatic, intellect can be shut off
- Kant is not mystical and dogmatic, but neither is it something that is phenomenal
- noumenal self, the free rational will, can access the good
- and the good is simply a requirement for action
- duty is acting in necessity of the law
- *the law – the objective, absolute law; that is, principle of action
- Kant is drawing on the contemporary understanding that this kind of law is given by God
- not only is a physical order created but a moral order
- if it helps you to do what is right to believe in a God that will damn you if you do wrong, then do that
- each one of us has the choice to be moral
- what makes us seem so different is the phenomenal self
- but that difference is a difference decreed by experience, not by the way things are; we can let those differences override ourselves, but when I do that, it must be possible to make a distinction between us, and the only differences that can be made are phenomenal
- the categorical imperative can be expressed in any number of ways
equality and liberty are found in the noumenal self
we are most free when I govern myself
so, if you want to be free as an individual, then you ought to want to govern yourself
- 2nd Formulation of the Categorical Imperative
- this formulation has content, the first did not
- “Act always with respect for humanity, whether in oneself or in others, and never treat humanity as merely a means but always as an end.”
- treat humanity as humanity
- never treat someone as a tool to get an end
- if I command you to do something that I would not myself do, then I am treating you as an implement for my will
- and I am denying that you have a free and rational will
- when I force you to succumb
- so to treat humanity as humanity is to treat each person as a free and autonomous person
- a free rational thing cannot will something irrational
- if I will something just for me then I am willing something for just me
- every free, rational person must do this
*if your rational faculty has been impaired (by drinking to excess) you are not capable of responding morally because you have made yourself something that cannot make moral demands on others and you have no moral rights because you have made it so that you are not capable of responding morally.
- the noumenal self is constrained by logical necessity, but not causal necessity
- and Kant is speculating here, because it cannot be demonstrated except through its effects
- I experience my will but always only phenomenally
- what makes this will potentially moral is that it's freedom can be constrained by reason
- Categorical Imperative (formal expression of the good)
- generates moral duties
- Criteria
- must be willable
- must be universalizable
- duty to oneself not to will something that is contradictory → that requires you to be other than you are
- however, you can will irrational things, but Kant says you ought not do this
- must be a maxim – must be formed as a principle
- must be time constrained
- 'categorical' imperative generates duties across the whole category, and they apply without exception
- if it is a duty → it is an absolute
- Hypothetical Imperatives ('conditional imperative')
- is also an imperative – generates a 'must' or a 'duty'
- generates non-moral duties“If X, then do Y”
- do is an imperative
- Y is completely dependent upon Y
- if there is no X, there is no duty to do Y
- conditionals are not moral, however, because morality is absolute
- none of these: I have a duty to do X, except for in this situation
- ex. “If you want to inherit granny's fortune, you should visit her in the hospital”
- ex. “I love granny, so then I should visit her in the hospital”
- why is this not moral?
- Because if you substitute 'love' for 'hate,' then the corresponding action would be different
- to visit or not visit depends on the moral state
- it may be that I have a moral duty to go visit grandmother, but if it's a moral duty to visit her it must be regardless of my attitude toward her
- Kant on making a false promise: point is to get a person to give you something
- loans
- people won't lend money unless they are assured you will pay them back
- false promise → universalized → promises are worthless
- the false promise only works if it is not universalized
- when everyone makes false promises, the whole purpose of promising is lost
- Kant on morality in a nutshell:
- morality is conceptually tied to reason
- morality has a certain form/structure – to moral principles/duties, and that form is logical, but it is also practical
- Korsgaard's discussion draws out the practicality
- the will is tied to you, it is your will and you are constrained by time, space, causation, so you can experience yourself spatially, temporally through causal relations
- but...if the only constraint on morality was reason, then that would not give us morality, because that would ignore the fact that actions are done by people (in other words, it is unpractical)
- the will must take into consideration practical constraints
- the will must ask, “Can I do this?”
- if not possible, (and not because it is hard or inconvenient) if it cannot be done, then the will is not willing it as a moral thing
- it must be possible to do X for X to be moral
- the good will is what is both logically possible and possible to be done
- it is possible for the will to be irrational – it must first be rational to be moral
- Kant: logical possibility means it is not contradictory
- categorical imperatives: generate universally valid absolute duties (without exceptions)
- hypothetical imperatives: generate conditional non-moral duties (which are non-moral because they are not universally valid)
- morality is about purposive action → aimed at some goal
- we can take any number of actions which might bring us this goal
- but it is immoral to act not according to duty
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