Samuel Clarke’s Version of the Cosmological Argument

Samuel Clarke (October 11, 1675 – May 17, 1729) was an English philosopher and Anglican Minister.


McCormick’s Reconstruction:

1.  Every being in the universe is either changeable and dependent (contingent), or they are not.

A.  A necessary being is not dependent upon anything else for its existence, and it is not logically possible for it to not exist.    
B.  A contingent  being is dependent upon something else for its existence, and it is logically possible for it to exist or not to exist.    


2.  More specifically, as Clarke sees it, the entire chain of beings in the universe is either:




A.  An infinite chain of contingent beings, or it is

B.  A chain of dependent, changeable beings that depend upon an independent, unchangeable (necessary) being.

What has Clarke left out here?  What presumptions is he starting with?


3.  If 2.A. is true, then the cause of the entire chain is either external or internal to the chain.

Why?  I.  The Principle of Sufficient Reason.  Everything must have a cause or explanation of its existence.
II.  “Internal or external” to the chain is an exhaustive list of options, a comprehensive disjunct.

4.  The cause of the entire chain cannot be external to the chain.

Why not?  because the series, by definition, includes every single being in the universe.  Nothing can be external to the ENTIRE chain of beings in the universe, or that chain wouldn’t be entire.

5.  If the cause of the entire chain was internal to the chain of contingent beings, then the cause of the chain would be a contingent being, and a chain of contingent beings would be dependent upon the existence of a dependent being for its existence.  

6.  In that case, the whole chain would necessarily exist:  it would not have anything else upon which it is dependent.

7.  All of the properties of contingent beings are contingent; the being could have had that property or it could have failed to have it.  Necessary properties, or necessary existence do not occur contingently; they are an intrinsic or essential part of a being:

“Tis manifest the whole cannot be necessary; absolute necessity of existence, not being an outward, relative, and accidental determination; but an inward and essential property of the thing which so exists.”

8.  So it is impossible that the entire chain of beings in the universe is contingent and that that chain has one of its members as its cause.


9.  So 2.A., the hypothesis that the univerise is made up only of an infinite chain of contingent beings, is false.  





10.  Therefore, there must be a chain of contingent beings that depend upon a necessary being for their existence.





11.  That being is God.  




1.  If everything that ever existed was a contingent, dependent, changeable thing, then the set of everything would be without a cause.
2.  But everything has to have a cause—PSR.
Why is the PSR true?  If it wasn’t, what would the implications for science, or arguments for God be?
3.  Therefore, it cannot be that everything that ever existed was a contingent, dependent, changeable thing.
In other words, at least one thing must have been a necessary, independent, unchangeble thing.
4.  That’s God.



From Wikipedia:





Philosophy


Clarke was eminent in theology, mathematics, metaphysics and philology, but his chief strength lay in his logical power. The materialism of Hobbes, the pantheism of Spinoza, the empiricism of Locke, the determinism of Leibniz, Collins' necessitarianism, Dodwell's denial of the natural immortality of the soul, rationalistic attacks on Christianity, and the morality of the sensationalists--all these he opposed with a thorough conviction of the truth of the principles which he advocated.


His reputation rests to a large extent on his effort to demonstrate the existence of God and his theory of the foundation of rectitude.


The former is not a purely a priori argument, nor is it presented as such by its author.


It starts from a fact and it often explicitly appeals to facts.


The intelligence, for example, of the self-existence arid original cause of all things is, he says, "not easily proved a priori," but "demonstrably proved a posteriori from the variety and degrees of perfection in things, and the order of causes and effects, from the intelligence that created beings are confessedly endowed with, and from the beauty, order, and final purpose of things." The theses maintained in the argument are:


That something has existed from eternity


that there has existed from eternity some one immutable and independent being


that that immutable and independent being, which has existed from eternity, without any external cause of its existence, must be self-existent, that is, necessarily existing


what the substance or essence of that being is, which is self-existent or necessarily existing, we have no idea, neither is it at all possible for us to comprehend it


that though the substance or essence of the self-existent being is itself absolutely incomprehensible to us, yet many of the essential attributee of his nature are strictly demonstrable as well as his existence, and, in the first place, that he must be of necessity eternal


that the self-existent being must of necessity be infinite and omnipresent


must be but one


must be an intelligent being


must be not a necessary agent, but a being endued with liberty and choice


must of necessity have infinite power


must be infinitely wise, and


must of necessity be a being of infinite goodness, justice, and truth, and all other moral perfections, such as become the supreme governor and judge of the world.


In order to establish his sixth thesis, Clarke contends that time and space, eternity and immensity, are not substances, but attributes-the attributes of a self-existent being.