Outline of cosmological arguments

I.  Cosmological Arguments

1.Defined:  cosmological arguments typically reason that that the universe, or the chain of causes and effects in the world, or the objects that we see existing around us  require a first cause or a supernatural cause to account for their existence.

Something could not have come from nothing.

Everything has to have a cause.

The chain of events or causes cannot go back infinitely in history—there must be a starting point.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmological_argument

2.  Some Terms.  A number of basic concepts and tools are explained on a handout:Some Logical Basics linked towards the bottom of our syllabus.

Necessary beings

Contingent beings

Principle of Sufficient Reason

A priori truths

A posteriori truths

2.Aquinas:  Dominican monk  (1225-1274).  One of the greatest theologians in history.  He argues that essential claims like God exists can be known and demonstrated through the use of reason.  He gives 5 ways.  In your text.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm#3

Notes in WebCT Cosmological Arguments folder

3.  The Second Way

a.  efficient cause.

b.  problems:

i. circular?

ii.  not everything has a distinct cause

iii.  if everything must have a cause, then the first cause appears to violate the rule

iv.  no divine attributes

v.  A series cannot be infinite, but God can?

4.  The Third Way

a.  necessary and contingent beings

b.  problems:  Fallacy of Composition

c.  No Divine attributes

d.  Not all things are contingent is not equiv. to A single nec. being, God, exists.

5.  Samuel Clarke's Cosmological argument Anglican minister, 1675-1729.

6.  Problems—see notes in WebCT

7.  What is the domain of the PSR?

a.  Five Eskimos Problem

7.  William Lane Craig:  The Kalaam Cosmological Argument

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Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Five Ways of Proving God’s Existence

I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and                      evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from  potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be  actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be   put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

 The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been                      already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate  the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and,  consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

Thomas Aquinas Second Way of Proving God’s Existence

Aquinas’ Second Way of Proving God’s Existence

There is an order of causes and effects in the world.

Causes are always prior to their effects in time.

If something caused itself, it would have to precede itself in time, which is impossible.

So it is impossible for something to be its own cause.

In a series of causes, the first cause brings about the intermediate causes, which bring about the current or final member.

If the series goes on forever (into the past), then there will be no first cause.

If the first cause is eliminated, then there can be no intermediate or current members in the series.

But there are intermediate and current members of the series.

So there must have been a first cause.  (A series that recedes infinitely into the past is impossible.)

We call this first cause “God.”




Aquinas’ Third Way of Proving God’s Existence


Everything is either contingent or necessary.

Since things in nature are generated and then decay, they are contingent beings.
That is, it is possible for them to exist or fail to exist, and their existence is dependent upon things other than themselves.

3.  If something is contingent, then there must have been a time when it failed to exist.

4.  If everything is contingent, then there must have been a time when nothing existed.

5.  Everything that comes into existence must have been caused to exist by some other thing that already exists.

6.  If nothing existed at one time, nothing could have ever come into existence.

7.  That is, if everything was contingent, then nothing would exist now.

8.  But something does exist now:  all of the things we see around us.

9.  Therefore, everything that exists cannot be contingent.

10.  That is, some necessary being(s) must exist.

11.  There cannot be an infinitely receding series of necessary beings.  See the Second Way.
A.  If the series of all things recedes infinitely, then there would be no first cause.
B.  If there is no first cause, then there would be no subsequent effects.
C.  There are subsequent effects (as is obvious around us).

D.  Therefore, there must have been a first cause.

12.  So there must be  some necessary being that derives its necessity from itself, not from another necessary being.

13.  That necessary thing is God.

The Fallacy of Composition is the mistake of thinking that if the parts of a whole all possess a property, then the whole collection of them must possess the property too.
In some cases, the inference appears to be valid:  if all of the parts of a car are red, then the whole car will be red.  Or if every part of a chair is made of wood, then the whole chair is made of wood.

But the properties of the parts might or might not transfer to the whole.  If every part of a car weighs less than 100 lbs, it does not follow that the whole car weighs less than 100 lbs.

And Aquinas' mistake regarding the time when contingent things did not exist can be seen in this example:

1.  There was a time when every person in the room was born.
2.    Therefore, there was a single, concurrent time when every person in the room was born.